Reportage published on December 9, 2012

Deconstructing the 1962 war

‘Hindi-Chinee Bhai Bhai’
When one talks about the cold winter of 1962 that saw snow-capped terrain soaked in blood from Indian as well as Chinese sides, one often tends to forget the events prior to actual war inflicted upon India by China.
These events will have to be traced back since 1949, when India had started championing the cause of newly proclaimed People’s Republic of China with Mao Tse-Tung as Chairman and Zhou En-Lai as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. On October 1, 1949, People’s Republic of China was proclaimed with Communists coming to power, and on December 30, 1949, India became the second non-Communist nation after Burma to recognize it. Soon after, in 1950, China started working on its agenda and sent its troops into Tibet. Similarly, it also meddled into affairs of Korea, following which United Nations putforth a resolution dubbing China as aggressor in Korean war. However, the then Indian Prime Minister Pt Jawaharlal Nehru had made it a policy to support China everywhere. Accordingly, India opposed United Nations resolutions against China.
Surprisingly, India did not stop at this. Under Pt Nehru, it backed China’s membership of the United Nations in December 1950. By May 1951, Chinese forces had reached deep inside Tibet and forced Tibetan Governor of Chamdo to sign an agreement that conceded China’s full ‘suzerainty’ over Tibet.. Across the world, there was a hue and cry over human rights violations by China in Tibet. However, India had preferred to ignore it. The next year, in 1952, India moved closer to China with establishment of cultural contacts. In 1954, Pt Nehru and Zhou En-Lai signed an agreement on trade between India and ‘Tibet region of China’ and the slogan was given ‘Hindi-Chinee Bhai Bhai’. The sloganeering continued with Indian and Chinese leaders visiting each other’s countries to promote cultural, trade, and goodwill exchanges.
In May 1954, China and India signed famous ‘Panchsheel Agreement’ or ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence’ of which main clauses were mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and mutual non-aggression. By this time, China had made India agree to her suzerainty over Tibet. This was what China wanted to extract from India.

The controversial Chinese maps
In 1950s, some of the Chinese maps in circulation showed 93,240 sq kms of on North-Eastern frontier of India and 31,080 sq kms in North-Eastern Ladakh as part of China. Prime Minister Pt Nehru raised the issued with the Chinese Government, to which Chinese Premier Zhou En-Lai sought to treat these maps as ‘of little significance’. In fact, the Chinese Premier said that the maps were reproductions of old maps and that the People’s Republic of China had got no time to revise them.
After signing of ‘Panchsheel Agreement’ in May 1954, China started showing its teeth. In July the same year, China registered protest against presence of Indian troops in Barahoti in erstwhile state of Uttar Pradesh in India, and claimed that Barahoti was part of China. Again, premiers of both the countries met and decided to sort out the issue with maturity. However, the controversy over Chinese maps showing large parts of India as in China continued. In July 1958, an official
Chinese publication ‘China Pictorial’ came out with a map showing all of North-Eastern Frontier Agency (NEFA), large areas of Ladakh, considerable areas in Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh, and even large areas of eastern and north-eastern Bhutan as part of China.
Alarmed, the Indian Government brought this to notice of the Chinese Government.
Again, the Chinese said that the map was ‘reprint’ of old maps published before 1949. However, this time, there was addition also. The Chinese said that they had not yet undertaken ‘a survey of their boundaries, nor consulted the countries concerned and they would not make changes in the boundary on their own.’ This made Chinese intentions clear. In fact, when Pt Nehru wrote to Zhou En-Lai, the latter replied that border issue was not raised at the time of signing of ‘Panchsheel Agreement’ as then ‘the conditions were not ripe for settlement.’

Tibet-Sinkiang Road and
‘Hindi-Chinee Bye-Bye’
Meanwhile, there was another development apart from controversy over Chinese maps. After annexing Tibet, China focused on strategic operations to ‘secure borders’ of Tibet. However, there was a problem for China. The road connecting eastern Tibet to China was a longer one and to keep a tighter control over Tibet, China needed to connect Lhasa with Beijing through another safer route. It explored constructing a motorable road connecting western Tibet and Sinkiang to strengthen both the ends militarily.
However, it could not be constructed except for through Aksai Chin of Ladakh region of India. As Aksai Chin was uninhabited, the Chinese activities of survey and construction remained unnoticed for a long time. After completing survey, China started constructing the road through Aksai Chin in 1955. On October 6, 1957, Sinkiang-Tibet road was ‘opened’ formally with a ceremony. Surprisingly, the Indian Government came to know about it in January 1958 only, when the New China News Agency reported opening and utilization of Sinkiang-Tibet highway.
By this time, China had started shedding its cloak and had started sending its troops to survey areas in Ladakh, NEFA and other parts. Everytime India registered a protest, it experienced that China’s stand of friendship was diluting. And, thus came the end of Hindi-Chinee bond. In short, China created a situation that marked ‘bye-bye’ to ‘Hindi-Chinee’ bond.
 

Skirmishes before 1962
Though it is widely believed that actual war began on October 19/20, 1962, history tells that China had given enough indications of its territorial ambitions by way of sending her troops into Indian territory south of McMahon Line. Here are three select incidents that took place between 1954 and 1959.

Barahoti incident of 1954
On July 17, 1954, the People’s Republic of China first made claim to part of Indian territory of Barahoti, which they called Wu-Je. On this very date, the Chinese launched a ‘protest’ against ‘presence’ of Indian troops in Barahoti, around three KMs south of a border pass of Tun Jun La in Uttar Pradesh. At present, Barahoti is in Uttarakhand.
On August 27, 1954, Indian Government pointed out to China that ‘there was no question of violation of Tibetan territory since Barahoti was south of Niti pass and inside Indian territory.’ It also protested an attempt by the Chinese officials to cross into Barahoti. Obviously, the Chinese had started showing their true colours by violating the agreement with India signed in April 1954, that is, just three months back.
The official history of 1962 war, which is yet to be made a part of public domain, has an account of the Chinese intrusions into Barahoti and other parts of Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. This is what the history says: “In June 1955, Chinese troops camped on Barahoti plain, and in September, they even trespassed 16 KMs south of Niti pass to Damzan and threatened an Indian
detachment. In April 1956, an armed Chinese party of twelve, including an officer, intruded into the Nilang-Jadhang area in Uttar Pradesh. In September 1956, three intrusions by Chinese troops took place across the Shipki pass into Himachal Pradesh. In the first incident, on September 1, 1956, about 10 Chinese soldiers entered the Indian side of the Shipki La (La means pass) and took up positions about 400 metres from Hupsang Khad. But, they withdrew when Indian policemen pointed out to their leader that the Indian territory extended up to the pass. On September 10, 1956, a Chinese party of about ten soldiers was again sighted on the Indian side of the Shipki La. The Indian patrol signaled the Chinese to withdraw, but instead of withdrawing, they pelted stones on Indian policemen and threatened to use grenades.
In spite of reminders by the Indians that the border was situated at Shipki La, the Chinese troops remained there at least till September 12, 1956. In the third incident, an Indian BSF patrol party came face to face with twenty Chinese troops near Hupsang Khad, a little over six kilometers from Shipki La on the Indian side. The Indian Commanding Officer asked the Chinese to withdraw. But, he (the leader of Chinese party) replied that he had instructions to patrol up to Hupsang Khad and threatened to use arms if the Indians tried to proceed towards Shipki La.
Since 1956, Chinese soldiers had been making annual incursions into the Kauirik area, situated in the Spiti region of Himachal Pradesh. The Indian Government protested against these encroachments; which all took place in the central sector of the India-China border, south of the border passes recognized as such in the agreement of (April) 1954. The Chinese Government either claimed that those places were in Chinese territory or denied that there had been any intrusion.”
In this description there are some interesting points to note. One, the solid Indian posts were not present in the area at that time as is evident from the policemen pointing out the border to intruding Chinese soldiers. Two, leader of a Chinese party of 20 replying to Indian Commanding Officer that he had ‘instructions to patrol up to Hupsang Khad’ shows that there was some definite Chinese design being shaped at least six years before the 1962 war. Three, Chinese frequenting the areas was part of surveillance exercise to know the terrain and to ascertain or assess presence of Indian troops or posts in these areas.
Unfortunately, the Indian Government of the time did nothing on ground except for moving papers of protest and reminders, as it believed that Chinese would not attack India. Obviously, the one who does not take serious note of signals in such situations, has to face the crisis ahead. And, this is what happened six years later in Ladakh and NEFA.

The Longju incident of 1959
Apart from continuing reconnaissance and probing patrols being sent to Indian territory along borders with Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh), the Chinese started making their aggressive stand clearer with every passing year. In 1959, in an incident at Longju, the Chinese attacked a forward picket of Indian post at Longju in Subansiri Frontier Division in NEFA and killed one soldier while injuring another and arresting the others.
The official history has a little description of the incident: “On August 25, 1959, a 200 to 300 strong Chinese detachment crossed the frontier in the Subansiri Frontier Divison near Longju, surrounded and fired at the forward picket of a dozen Assam Rifles men. One person was killed and another was seriously wounded.
The rest of the lot were arrested. A few men, who were away on duty, escaped and reported to the post at Longju. The next day, the Chinese came again, and encircled the small Indian garrison at the main post in Longju. The garrison personnel had to fire back in self-defence. Under overwhelming pressure, the Longju post had to withdraw ultimately. The Government of India sent a note of protest against this provocative aggressive act correcting thereby the untruthful version of the incident advanced by Chinese note given earlier.”

The Changchenmo incident:
The Army is called in
IN the western sector (Ladakh) also, Chinese were in an aggressive mood. As the journalist Neville Maxwell points out in his book ‘India’s China War’ (an account that portrays India as the aggressor), the Indian Government had decided to set up border posts at three points to the north-east of Leh. “These were well short of the boundary shown on the Chinese maps, even that being then for most of its length beyond the logistical reach of the Indians,” he states in his book (Page 110).
Maxwell further describes in brief what happened at Changchenmo: “At the same time, however, it was decided that a patrol should go up to Changchenmo valley to the Lanak pass, which India regarded as the boundary feature, to establish a post there. Moving up the Changchenmo valley after having set up the other posts, this patrol of about seventy men of the special border police came into contact with the Chinese at the Kongka pass – the Chinese regard that as the boundary feature and, getting there first, had established a post. An Indian scouting party of three was detained by the Chinese on October 20; next day in a sharp affray nine of the main Indian force were killed and seven taken prisoner. The Chinese also suffered casualties, but probably of only one killed.”
Of course, even if one goes by the number of persons killed, it becomes clear that who was attacking. This is another feature, as Brigadier J P Dalvi describes in his book ‘The Himalayan Blunder’, showing lack of clarity on ‘higher direction of war’ a the highest levels of the Indian Government. Every time, when Chinese intruded into Indian territory, India sent ‘polite’ note of protest to the Chinese and the latter treated them merely as another piece of paper. However, when India tried to establish post inside her own territory, the Chinese did not stop at sending protest notes but mounted attack on Indians inside the former’s own territory.
The Indian official history of 1962 war, released for restricted consumption in 1993, explains the aftermath of the Changchenmo valley/Kongka pass incident. The most significant impact that the incident had was forcing the Indian Government to call in the Army. “The mask from the Chinese face was off now. It was, therefore, decided that the responsibility of safeguarding the northern borders should be given to the Army. The Army was called upon to protect the border with Tibet in the Eastern Sector after the Longju incident and the border in the Western Sector was handed over to the Army on October 24, 1959, immediately after the Kongka pass incident,” states the official history. 

1959: The Dalai Lama factor

This is one more factor, or catalyst, that shaped the course of Chinese aggression of 1962. However, it must be kept in mind that this was not the sole reason behind the Chinese getting more aggressive. As explained earlier, the Chinese had shown their teeth by way of killing Indian personnel and attacking Indian posts at various points along the 3,500 KMs long border with China and Tibet.

In 1949 itself, People’s Republic of China (PRC) under Chairman Mao Tse Tung had started the exercise of asserting her borders with other countries to the extent of attempting to settle the disputes by force. The same year, she attacked Tibet after convincing the Chinese people that the latter was always a part of China and Tibet was to be acceded to. In September 1949, Communist forces of China over-run Sinkiang and this had serious security implications or India. With fall of Sinkiang, India’s norther borders of Ladakh became contiguous with China. In January 1950, the Indian Intelligence Bureau warned the Government of foreseeable threat of the Chinese advancing into Lhasa, the capital of Tibet. Towards the end of 1950, China occupied Tibet militarily. Though there was pressure on the Indian Government to intervene and protest human rights violations in Tibet by the Chinese forces, the former was in no position to counter the Chinese forces. This was so because Indian Army was spread out in various areas along Pakistan border and only one battalion could be spared for some other assignment, which was no match to over 20,000 strong Chinese forces advancing towards Lhasa by January 1951.

Meanwhile, Tibetans had started forming rebel groups to fight the Chinese military aggression. By 1959, the Khampa rebellion strengthened and spread into central and southern Tibet. The Chinese troops and pro-Dalai Lama groups clashed at various places. Thousands of Tibetans started entering into Indian territory seeking refuge. According to some records, the Chinese had planned to kidnap Dalai Lama and crush the Tibetan resistance (which continues till date). Probably, learning about this plan, Dalai Lama left Lhasa in disguise on March 17, 1959 and reached area inside Indian border at Khinzemane on March 31. India welcomed Dalai Lama and granted him asylum. However, this made China furious. As official history points out, “…although they themselves had given asylum to many political activists from Nepal, Malaysia, Thailand, Burma, etc.” The Chinese strongly objected to ‘expression of sympathy with the Tibetan cause by public, press, and Parliament in India.”

Interestingly, three years later, the Chinese concentrated on this very route of Khinzemane-Bum La- Tawang-Bomdi La through which Dalai Lama had moved down deeper into Indian territory.

Govt orders Army to evict the Chinese

Relations between India and China had grown bitter following shooting incidents in Ladakh by summer of 1962. Except for Longju and Khinzemane incidents, Eastern Sector or North-Eastern Frontier Agency (NEFA) had remained peaceful. However, in August 1962, Chinese disturbed the calm by crossing the border and occupying Thag La Ridge. The Chinese did not stop at this. On September 8, they also encircled Indian post at Dhola, south of river Namka Chu. However, the Indian leadership was in an aggressive mood and it decided to counter the Chinese with force without having a realistic assessment of own prowess. As a result, it asked the Army to chalk out plans to evict the Chinese from Indian territory.

Operation Leghorn

Soon after the Chinese occupied Thag La ridge, a high-level meeting was held at Delhi on September 9, 1962. Defence Minister V K Krishna Menon presided over the meeting that was attended by Chief of Army Staff Gen P N Thapar, GOC-in-C of Eastern Command Lt Gen L P Sen, Cabinet Secretary S S Khera, Joint Secretary in Ministry of Defence H C Sarin, Director of Intelligence Bureau B N Mullick and others.

In the meeting it was decided to evict the Chinese from south of Thag La Ridge ‘immediately and by force if necessary’. Accordingly, the decision was conveyed to Eastern Command, which passed it on to 33 Corps and 4 Infantry Division to carry out the same. To evict the Chinese from Dhola, 9 Punjab was asked to move immediately there and 7 Brigade was asked to join it within two days. As per the order, all troops were to go prepared for the battle. If possible, attempt was to be made to encircle the Chinese troops that had encircled Dhola post. And, this operation to evict the Chinese was named ‘Operation Leghorn’. However, for obvious reasons, the troops could not move within 48 hours as specified.

While the Indian Army was preparing for ‘Operation Leghorn’, the Chinese had fine-tuned their strategy for attack. On September 20, around 10.40 pm, the Chinese lobbed hand-grenades into one of the bunkers of the Indian side at Dhola, leaving three injured. As a result, Indians had no choice but to fire at the Chinese, who were waiting for this reaction to mount their attack. Till September 29, firing continued intermittently.

The new development along with reports of enhancement in Chinese build-up along Namka Chu led to Gen Thapar asking the Government to ‘reconsider’ decision regarding Operation Leghorn. In a meeting held on September 22, he put his case across to Deputy Defence Minister K Raghuramaiah, who chaired the meeting in absence of both Prime Minister Pt Jawaharlal Nehru and Defence Minister Menon.

Surprisingly, according to the official history of the 1962 war, it was the then Foreign Secretary who explained the Prime Minister’s instructions and the Government’s view that ‘no infringement of the border in NEFA was to be accepted.’ According to official history, “He (the Foreign Secretary) was of the opinion that the Army must build-up strength in Dhola area and evict the Chinese from Indian territory there even at the cost of Chinese reaction in Ladakh which, according to him, could at the most be to try and capture a post or two.” Rejection of the Army General’s assessment in this manner by an officer who was not an expert on strategic and military intricacies, speaks a lot about lack of operational assessment at the Government’s level.

However, surprises did not stop here. Realising the consequences of implementing such a decision in the given situation, Gen Thapar asked for an order in writing of the Government. Shockingly, he received a note signed by Joint Secretary (Defence) H C Sarin that stated, “The decision throughout has been as discussed at previous meetings, that the Army should prepare and throw the Chinese out as soon as possible. The COAS (Chief of Army Staff) was accordingly directed to take action for the eviction of the Chinese in the Kameng Frontier Division of NEFA as soon as he is ready.” In hindsight, it is really surprising that an officer with administrative acumen could ‘direct’ the Army chief on issues concerning the serious task of war with a superior and well-prepared enemy.

Still, Gen Thapar passed on the instructions to Lt Gen L P Sen, who forwarded the same to Lt Gen Umrao Singh of 33 Corps to formulate an outline plan for Operation Leghorn with ‘utmost speed’. The order passed on to Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad, who passed it on to Brigadier J P Dalvi of 7 Brigade. Accordingly, Brig Dalvi prepared a plan to capture a small feature Tseng Jong on Thag La slopes and then continue to eastern side to positions held by the Chinese on Namka Chu. However, he also made it clear that there would be no scope for the operations during winter if proper logistic base was not ready within a fortnight. Of course, he had given a

deeper thought to the requirements to execute the operation. The plan was passed on to Lt Gen Sen on September 29. Unfortunately, Lt Gen Sen refused to accept the requirements stipulated for operation.

Formation of IV Corps and Lt Gen Kaul

So hell-bent was the then establishment on carrying out the operation that it made changes in structure that suited them. Lt Gen Umrao Singh was divested of the responsibility of NEFA. A new IV Corps was created and Lt Gen B M Kaul, considered close to Prime Minister Nehru, was asked to command it. Kaul was Chief of General Staff before taking up the charge of IV Corps on October 3. He was assigned the task of evicting the Chinese from Dhola-Thag La area. He visited Dhola post and later considered October 10 as deadline for execution of Operation Leghorn irrespective of logistic and other support sought by Brig Dalvi. In fact, he went a step further and set the goal of occupying Yumtso La, a feature west of Thag La peak. Though Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad and Brig Dalvi brought it to his notice that Indian troops were in cotton uniforms and they would be either frozen or starve to death if the Chinese cut off line of communication, Lt Gen Kaul brushed aside ‘those misgivings’. As a result, the forces went ahead with the plan.

Op Leghorn is shelved

The plan was ambitious and good on paper but though the troops were ordered to move on, necessary support was not given a better thought to. Besides, the Chinese had superior, automatic weapons and Indian soldiers were not equipped with matching fire-power. Most importantly, the Chinese had been preparing for the situation for long, and political leadership on Indian side was living in paradise of its own creation. All this led to setting higher goals without deeper thought to military requirements. As a result, though there was initial advance in Namka Chu and Dhola areas, soon the Chinese forced Indian side to withdraw.

On October 8, Indian troops occupied Tseng-Jong and another section occupied Karpola II, without any Chinese reaction. However, on October 10, Indian troops moving up southern bank of Namka Chu to proceed on operation to occupy Yumtso La, came under the Chinese attack. The Chinese also attacked Tseng-Jong position held by Indians simultaneously. There, Indian troops had only pouch ammunition with them making the officer-in-charge Maj M S Chaudhary move a request for machine gun and mortar fire from Bridge IV position, but it was not acceded to. Meanwhile, following Chinese heavy fire, the section at Karpola II was asked to withdraw to Tseng-Jong. Later on, as the Chinese mounted attack on Tseng-Jong also, troops there were ordered to withdraw to south of Namka Chu. However, in the action, six died, five went missing, and 11 including Major Chaudhary were injured. Of course, the Indian troops demonstrated bravery of top class and through firing and hand-to-hand fighting, killed as many as 77 Chinese and left 100 injured.

Following this development, another high-level meeting was held on October 11. In the meeting presided over by Prime Minister Nehru and attended by Defence Minister Menon and others, Lt Gen Kaul made a presentation on the situation, following which decision was taken to cancel orders of attack but to hold the present positions. The next day, Nehru left for Colombo. On way to Colombo, at the airport, he told the media, “Our instructions are to free our country.” The next few days saw more meetings at various levels and the Chinese also did not mount a major attack. On October 18, Lt Gen Kaul took ill and was shifted from IV Corps headquarters at Tezpur to Delhi. However, instead of handing over charge to someone else, he decided to hold the command from his sick bed. In fact, on the same day, when Brig Dalvi protested the order to send two more companies to strengthen Tsangle as it would stretch supply effort of 7 Brigade to breaking point, Lt Gen Kaul told Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad, “Build up at Tsangle must be carried out. Otherwise, the officers defaulting in implementing these orders would be removed.” By this time, Operation Leghorn was abandoned though it still remained ‘on paper’

Memories of war

The Chinese aggression of 1962 left a mark on military history of India. It also left a scar on the history of Indian polity. Most of the times, impact of war on political and military leaderships is discussed and the impression left on the minds and hearts of the citizens of areas that saw is often forgotten. Since 1962, many people who saw war and fled the villages to save their life have passed away. Still, some are alive. Some of the middle-aged persons were kids in 1962 and they have some memories of the war. The younger generation did not see the war, but their elders told them stories, which they are able to recount when someone asks them about 1962. ‘The Hitavada’ visited some villages in present-day Arunachal Pradesh, which was war zone of 1962, and talked to the villagers of different age-groups.

Name: Pema
Town: Bhalukpong
After a bumpy ride when one reaches Bhalukpong, which marks end of Assam and starting point of Arunachal Pradesh, one gets to see a lot many people who are young. The town is buzzing with activities. There are not many people who even remember the 1962 war. However, some of the middle-aged persons have some memories of war as their families had shifted from Tawang to Bhalukpong when war broke out.
Middle-aged persons like Pema what their parents told them as they grew up after the war. “I was a few months old when the war broke out and my father Changa and mother Drema shifted from Tawang to Bhalukpong,” says Pema, who is a police officer now. Based on what his parents told him, Pema recalls that the Chinese had bombed Tawang severely and many people had died in 1962. “My mother told me once that our house in Tawang was damaged badly and my parents fled the town to take shelter in caves. They were concerned about me as I was only a few months old. Fortunately, the bad phase passed away in a couple of months,” he says with a big smile on his face.
Pasang Sherpa and Amit Tamang, who are in their thirties, belong to the generation that knows nothing about war. “Not many of younger generation know of 1962 war except for what we have heard from our elders,” says Pasang. Amit Tamang recollects what an elder once told him, “Misamari is at a distance of around 65 kms from here. Elders told us that the Chinese had come up to Misamari and had erected fence also during 1962.” Barring these accounts, Bhalukpong does not have people who actually saw the Chinese during the war.


Name: Naresh Glow
Town: Tenga
Fifty years back, the Chinese had advanced into the Indian territory up to Tenga Valley and had even captured Indian post at Chakoo, 38 kms from Tenga town. Presently, Tenga is a garrison. The persons who were children in 1962, are now over 50 years of age. Naresh Glow is one such person.
At 53, Naresh remembers the period when he was only three-years-old. He remembers that his parents took him to places in a hurry. “My father, Jilly, later told me that the Chinese had attacked India in 1962 forcing many civilians to move out to plains. The Chinese had advanced from Zimithang and other such areas and had advanced down to Bomdila, Tenga, Phutil, Chakoo etc,” adds Naresh. At Chakoo, many Indian soldiers made the supreme sacrifice fighting the Chinese aggressors, he recalls.

Names: Thubchen Kasang, Wang Di, Tenzin Dondup
Town: Bomdi La
Bomdi La, which literally means ‘Lucky Pass’, was not a lucky town for residents fifty years back. As the Chinese advanced from Tawang to Bomdi La, many residents fled the town.
Thubchen Kasang, now 74-years-old, recalls that he was a bachelor when the Chinese aggression of 1962 started. As the Chinese advanced to Bomdi La, he also followed many others and left the town. Many people first moved to Phutil and when they felt the Chinese threat there also, they kept on moving downwards to Misamari.
Wang Di, who is 62 years of age now, had left Bomdi La with his family members. Then a 12-years-old boy, Wang Di accompanied his family to Mukto. When they learnt that the Chinese were coming to Mukto, they escaped to Khaluktong and then to Udalpuri. “We could return to Bomdi La after two months. Till then, we lived the life that we cannot imagine of now,” he says. Wang Di remembers that many residents of Bomdi La left the town on foot and many carried food-grains and some other belongings on mules and horses.
It may be mentioned here that the Chinese had captured Bomdi La on November 19, 1962. Despite Chinese aggression, no resident of Bomdi La said that he/she wanted to be with China. All were, and are, truly Indians and they have no hesitation in saying this again and again.
Tenzin Dondup, In-charge of Lower Gompa or monastery, did not see the war but he learnt about it from the seniors in the monastery. The monastery’s work was completed just in 1961, he tells. As the Chinese advanced to Bomdi La, five Lamas had left the town during war. They left to Uttar Pradesh and sought shelter there till the war came to an end. “As I am told, the Chinese had come to the town but they did not enter the monastery,” he adds.

Name: Lobsang
Town: Dirang
As one moves up from Bomdi La to Dirang, one realises that the scenic beauty of Arunachal Pradesh is becoming more and more impressive. Mornings are early and one can see sunrays kissing the mountain tops, the army of clouds that takes rest in the ridges and valleys at night starts coming out to invade the blue sky.
However, apart from the scenic beauty, there is more to the town of Dirang. It is a big market-place now. One can get everything from rich wine to imported leather items in shops here. And, in the line of shops is a good grocery shop owned by Lobsang, the Gaon Burah (village elder). As one enters Lobsang’s shop, one sees him busy with his wife making calculations or responding to queries of customers. Unmindful of the importance with which he is treated even by the Army, Lobsang continues with his work till he is interrupted.
Just utter ‘1962 war’ and Lobsang gets lost in the past. Now 64-years-old, Lobsang was 14 when the war broke out in 1962. The man who hails from village Namchu saw the blasts, firing and all the action fifty years back. “I saw firing from very close distance. I realised later that some bullets went past my head caressing hair,” he recalls with a slight shiver. Though a youngster then, he was full of patriotic spirit and he went extra miles to help out the Indian soldiers caught in the Chinese fire.
Apart from extending help to Indian soldiers, Lobsang actually kept an injured officer of the Indian Army at his residence. “He was badly wounded. I kept the officer at my residence but I was afraid also that someone from the town would tell the Chinese. Fortunately, nobody informed the Chinese. The officer got fit and left later. Even now I feel very happy that I could serve my country in my own way,” he tells with pride. There were many like Lobsang, who helped the Indian soldiers in and around Dirang. The Chinese had occupied the town of Dirang in 1962 and had set camps at various places. However, now memories of the war are fading and only a few persons like Lobsang actually remember what had taken place then.


Name: Rinzin
Town: Jang
Like many other towns and villages, Jang also saw exodus of local people to safer places in plains. In fact, the Chinese who had entered Jang, were furious and they had threatened the people here.
A 75-years-old Rinzin still shudders at the mention of the Chinese during 1962 war. The man, who runs a small-time grocery shop now, remembers clearly that he had to leave Jang and move to Dirang and then to Bomdi La fearing the Chinese wrath. Like him, local people were afraid of the Chinese as they used to threaten the locals of dire consequences if they did not wear ‘traditional dress’.
Why did the Chinese force locals to wear ‘traditional dress’? Most of the population in this part belongs to Mon Pa tribe that wears long over-coat-type woollen wear. The Chinese wanted to deceive the Indian forces by wearing this traditional dress. If the locals did not wear traditional dress, the Chinese would have been singled out. Hence, the Chinese insisted on locals wearing traditional dress so that they could not be identified easily by Indian forces. There are recorded instances of the Chinese soldiers wearing Mon Pa dress, hiding guns in the long dress, moving closer to Indian forces, and then firing and killing the Indian soldiers.

Name: Tashi
Town: Tawang
Tawang is the town that saw the maximum action during 1962 war. It is known as home to the biggest Buddhist monastery in India. It is also known for picturesque locations around. It is also known as the last civilian-town ahead of China border in this part of Arunachal Pradesh. Ta-Wang literally means ‘chosen by horse’.
After over-running Bum La and other posts, the Chinese advanced to Tawang and the Indian forces there were asked by bosses to withdraw. As a result, the Chinese took Tawang unopposed. There were many people in this town who actually saw the war, many who abandoned their houses. Some left the town forever and some returned once the war was over. Some have kept ‘souvenirs’ like helmets of soldiers who fought 1962 war. However, at present, there are only a few witnesses of the war. One of these persons is 90-year-old Tashi.
Tashi does not speak Hindi quite fluently, but understands Hindi. He throws light on deceptive behaviour of the Chinese after occupying Tawang. “Chinese soldiers asked us not to leave the town, not to abandon our houses. They said, “Why are you fleeing? Do not go away. We are related.” They wanted to impress upon us that Chinese and people at Tibet or Tawang had common origin,” he recalls. Though some fell prey to such a false propaganda, most of them identified themselves more with Indians.
Tashi also recollects another interesting feature of Chinese forces that occupied Tawang. “Apart from men, there were women soldiers also. These women soldiers used to work during day-time and return to their bases at night,” he tells. There are records and versions of Army officials that Chinese women soldiers got mixed with the local populace and offered tea to Indian soldiers and officials on their way to Tawang. While offering tea, these women soldiers extracted vital information from Indian officials/soldiers and passed it on to the Chinese higher-ups. Beautiful Chinese spies-cum-soldiers had become a big threat to Indian operations and when it was realised, interaction with locals was curtailed to local issues only.
When the Chinese entered Tawang, there were still Indian soldiers who could not escape in time. Local people knew the threat faced by the Indian soldiers and they helped them out. People of Tawang offered shelter to Indian soldiers and offered them Mon Pa dresses so that they could escape the town as locals. “We saved lives of many Indian soldiers this way,” Tashi tells. However, when the Chinese came to know about this, they started troubling locals also. This led to many locals leaving Tawang at a later stage.
At this age also, Tashi prefers going to farm and work there. However, the Chinese occupation of Tibet and 1962 aggression have left a scar on the hearts and minds of many like him. At present also, people of Tawang feel that Communist China brought misery for them. Tashi shows a little placard to echo sentiments of people of Tawang. This placard reads, “Remember 1962. Tibet’s freedom is India’s security and progress. Save Tibet.”